Galton: The Scope of the National Environmental Policy Act

THE SCOPE OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT: SHOULD THE 102(2)(C) IMPACT
STATEMENT PROVISION BE APPLICABLE TO A
FEDERAL AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES HAVING
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES WITHIN
ANOTHER SOVEREIGN'S JURISDICTION?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 1 established a comprehensive environmental policy for the nation by
requiring all federal agencies to evaluate the environmental impact
of their major activities. To accomplish this, the Act prescribes
certain procedural directives found in section 102(2). 2 Litigation
involving the NEPA has primarily dealt with these provisions and
in particular section 102(2)(C). Known as the "teeth" 3 of the Act,
this section requires each agency to prepare and to file a detailed
statement of the environmental impact a prospective project will
have before the agency decides to participate or to implement it. 4
Since its inception, federal agencies dealing in foreign policy
and foreign assistance programs have steadfastly resisted application of NEPA 102(2)(C) 5 requirements to their decisionmaking. The
case of Natural Resources Defense Council v. Export-Import Bank
of the United States 6 will test this resistance and determine whether
a federal agency's activity abroad having significant impact on the
environment of another country falls within the scope of the NEPA.
The Natural Resources Defense Council filed suit to enjoin the
Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), a federal agency, from financing
projects and purchases for foreign countries. Eximbank had not
prepared impact statements nor had it ever promulgated procedures
and guidelines to conform its decisionmaking processes to comply
with the requirements of the Act. 7
This Note will analyze the scope of the statute's 102(2)(C) provision to determine its applicability to federal agencies' actions
1. 42 u.s.c. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
2. Id. at § 4332(2).
3. Strausberg, The National Environmental Policy Act and The Agency for International
Development, 7 INT'L LAW. 46, 47 (1973).
4. 42 U.S.C . § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
5. Id. [hereinafter will also be cited by authorities in subsequent quotes in this paper
as 102(C)J.
6. No. 77-0080 (D.D.C. , filed Jan. 14, 1977).
7. Id.
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abroad. It will be demonstrated that a canon of construction, the
presumption against extraterritoriality, is a suitable and useful aid
in resolving this issue. With its guidance, an extensive examination
of statutory language and legislative history will be undertaken to
establish the intent of Congress, the primary duty of any statutory
analysis. It will then be observed that there is no clear indication of
congressional intent and, in its absence, it will be presumed that
Congress intended the statute's provision to be limited to the territorial boundaries of the nation. After concluding that in actuality
Congress' concern was primarily domestic, and therefore, its intent
was only to give 102(2)(E) and not 102(2)(C) an international scope,
an evaluation of relevant case law will be made to determine
whether there is any judicial support for the theory that 102(2)(C)
extends beyond the usual statutory reach. Finding no direct support
for this hypothesis, and instead, a strong indication that courts will
consider countervailing policy arguments, practical considerations
will be noted and scrutinized. In the final analysis, it will be determined that 102(2)(C) procedure should not apply to federal activities abroad.

II.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A. A Canon of Construction: The Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality. 11

Some guidance must be supplied before examining the statutory language and the legislative history in order to ascertain congressional intent. This aid comes in the form of a "wellestablished"11 canon of construction. In the absence of express language indicating a "contrary intent,"'° a statute will be construed
to apply only to conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States. 11
This canon of construction has aided courts in numerous cases
to determine the extraterritorial scope of various congressional enactments. For example, in American Banana Co. u. United Fruit
Co., 12 the Court held that the Sherman Act would not extend to
foreign restraint of trade activity by an American corporation. Util8. Note, The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's Environmental Impact Statement
Requirement, 74 MICH. L. REV. 349, 354 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mich. Note].
9. Id.
10. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S . 281, 285 (1949).
11. Id.; Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S . 421, 437 (1932) .
12. 210 U.S. 347 (1909).
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izing a strict territorial approach, Justice Holmes stated that "in
[a] case of doubt" statutes must be interpreted as embracing only
acts committed within the "territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power." 1:1 He concluded that the
acts performed in Panama and Costa Rica did not fall within the
ambit of the U.S. statute. 14 The Justice seemed to be concerned that
the comity of nations might be harmed by a holding to the contrary.
Although the strict territorial approach of American Banana
was subsequently modified in United States v. Bowman, 15 the Supreme Court, in Blackmer v. United States, 16 determined that Congress had the authority to extend its laws to govern the actions of
its citizens in other countries. The Court focused on the question of
statutory construction. Did Congress intend the law to be applicable
to its citizens abroad? 17 The Court utilized the canon of construction
to aid in its determination 111 that Congress had clearly indicated the
Act's scope would reach citizens residing abroad by expressly providing for the U.S. consul to serve process on these citizens.
In Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 19 the Court refused to extend the
Eight Hour Law 20 to public works projects built in Iran on behalf of
13. Id. at 357 (footnotes, omitted). The Court said:
It is obvious that, however stated, the plaintiffs case depends on several rather
startling propositions. In the first place the acts causing the damage were done, so
far as appears, outside the jurisdiction of the United States and within that of other
states. It is surprising to hear it argued that they were governed by the act of Congress.
The foregoing considerations would lead in case of doubt to a construction of any
statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits
over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power. "All legislation is prima
facie territorial."
Id. at 355, 357.
14. Id. at 357. "We think it entirely plain that what the defendant did in Panama or
Costa Rica is not within the scope of the statute so far as the present suit is concerned." Id.
15. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
16. 284 U.S . 421 (1932) .
17. Id. at 437. "[T]here is no question of international law, but solely of the purport of
the municipal law which establishes the duties of the citizen in relation to his own government." Id. (footnote omitted).
18. Id.
While the legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary intent appears, is construed
to apply only within the territorial United States, the question of its application, so
far as citizens of the United States in foreign countries are concerned, is one of
construction, not of legislative power.
Id.
19. 336 U.S. 281 (1949) .
20. Act of Aug. 1, 1892, ch . 352, 27 Stat. 340 (repealed by Act of Aug. 13, 1962, Pub. L.
87-581, title II, § 203, 76 Stat. 360).
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the United States. The question again was not of power but of
statutory construction. 21 The Court reaffirmed the "canon of construction"22 utilized in Blackmer and noted that "[i]t is based on
the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic
conditions. " 2a Thus the Court found "nothing in the Act itself, as
amended, nor in the legislative history, which would lead to the
belief that Congress entertained any intention other than the normal one in this case." 24
It would appear that Congress has taken into account the Foley
decision by providing the requisite express language in subsequent
federal statutes. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law 25 notes
several statutes which have been appropriately phrased so as to
apply to conduct occurring outside the United States. 26
The courts have, in certain circumstances, found an extraterritorial scope where the statute's language has not clearly indicated
such a reach. The courts still employ the Foley canon of construction, but in such cases imply that its strict use is unnecessary since
congressional intent is obvious. In United States v. Bowman, 27 the
criminal legislation involved did not specifically include in its scope
offenses committed on the high seas or in foreign countries. Noting
"it is natural for Congress to say so in the statute, and failure to do
so will negative the purpose of Congress in this regard, " 2R the Court
21. "The question before us is not the power of Congress to extend the Eight Hour Law
to work performed in foreign countries. Petitioners concede that such power exists . . . . The
question is rather whether Congress intended to make the law applicable to such work." 336
U.S. at 284-85.
22. Id. at 285.
23. Id.
24. Id. The Court continued by saying: "There is no language in the Eight Hour Law,
here in question, that gives any indication of a congressional purpose to extend its coverage
beyond places over which the United States has sovereignty or has some measure of legislative
control." Id.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1965).
26. Federal statutes designed to be applied to conduct taking place outside the
United States usually expressly so provide, e.g.:
(i) 18 U.S.C. §§ 7,9 (1958) dealing with offenses within the "special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States," including national vessels and
national aircraft.
18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1958) makes treason "within the United States or elsewhere"
an offense. The statute has in several cases been applied to acts of treason committed
outside the United States. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952) . . .
Id. at § 38.
27. 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
28. Id. at 98.
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did apply "the same rule of interpretation" 211 to criminal statutes
which were intended to protect the Government and its property.
Here, it can be logically inferred that Congress wishes to protect its
property and itself since the statute is entitled "Offenses against the
Operation of the Government.":111
The Lanham Act31 was interpreted in Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co. 32 as having language conferring "broad jurisdictional powers
upon the courts of the United States." 33 Although there is, arguably,
language of an express nature, 34 the Court primarily based its decision on the activities by the petitioner within the United States and
the domestic effect his activities had. The Court observed that component parts of the petitioner's "Bulovas" entered the United States
and concluded that this competition would have, in the United
States and elsewhere, an adverse effect on Bulova Watch Company's carefully "cultivated" trade name. 35
This opinion did not go unchallenged. In a strong dissent, 36
Justice Reed chastised the Court for its improper interpretation. In
his opinion, the only acts of infringement were to be found in Mexico.37 Thus, the question was one of statutory interpretation. 311 Utilizing the traditional canon of construction, the Justice determined
that there was no contrary congressional intent or explicit words
which could evidence an extraterritorial scope. 311
It should be noted that subsequently, in Vanity Fair Mills v.
T. Eaton Co., 40 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply
the Lanham Act to a trademark infringement by an alien in Canada, even though it might have had an adverse economic effect on
29. Id.
30. Id. at 98-99.
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
32. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
33. Id. at 283.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 286.
His operations and their effects were not confined within the territorial limits of a
foreign nation. He bought component parts of his wares in the United States and
spurious "Bulovas" filtered through the Mexican border into this country; his competing goods could well reflect adversely on Bulova Watch Company's trade reputation in markets cultivated by advertising here as well as abroad.

Id.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 289.
Id. at 290.
Id.
Id.
234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S . 871 (1956).
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American commerce. The court suggested that the Act would not
apply to a foreign citizen's acts within his own country in accordance with a valid trademark registration. 41
In Laurizton v. Larsen, 42 the Court interpreted the Jones Act 43
as not applying to a Danish seaman negligently injured aboard a
foreign ship while in Havana harbor. The Court considered and
rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the Jones Act would be applicable here in lieu of Danish law. "This contention that the Jones
Act provides an optional cumulative remedy is not based on any
explicit terms of the Act, which makes no provision for cases in
which remedies have been obtained or are obtainable under foreign
law." 44 The Justices perceived that the words employed in the stat41. 234 F.2d at 642. The court stated:
fWle do not think that Congress intended that the infringement remedies provided
in § 32(1 )(a) and elsewhere should be applied to acts committed by a foreign national
in his home country under a presumably valid trademark registration in that country.
The Lanham Act itself gives almost no indication of the extent to which Congress
intended to exercise its power in this area . . . .
In the Bulova case, . . . the Court stressed three factors: ( 1) the defendant's
conduct had a substantial effect on United States commerce; (2) the defendant was
a United States citizen and the United States has a broad power to regulate the
conduct of its citizens in foreign countries; and (3) there was no conflict with trademark rights established under the foreign law, since the defendant's Mexican registration had been canceled by proceedings in Mexico. Only the first factor is present
in this case.
We do not think that the Bulova case lends support to plaintiff; to the contrary,
we think that the rationale of the Court was so thoroughly based on the power of the
United States to govern "the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even
in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed", that the absence of one of the above factors might well be determinative
and that the absence of both is certainly fatal.
Id. at 642-43 (footnotes omitted).
The court does not state that if two of the factors are present (the defendant is a U.S.
citizen and there is no infringement on foreign law) this occurrence will be enough to waive a
showing of the third factor (substantial effect) and thus permit extraterritorial application
of the statute in question. In, Mich. Note, supra note 8, it was similarly argued that this canon
of construction rested on two considerations-that Congress was concerned with domestic
conditions and that Congress did not wish to infringe on the laws of other nations . It was
submitted that if there was no infringement on the laws of other countries then the presence
of the second factor (that Congress had not been primarily concerned with domestic conditions when enacting this legislation) would not be required and the clear expression necessary
under the canon need not be ascertained. This reasoning as the above quote shows is without
support. Nor does Foley show that there are two considerations on which this canon of
construction rests . It is more likely that the canon rests on domestic concern. Instead, the
court will take into account the presence of all three factors, especially domestic effect, (as
will be proven later) before deciding not to apply the canon strictly.
42. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
43. 46 U.S .C. § 688 (1970).
44. 345 U.S. at 576 (1953).
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ute were of a broad and sweeping character. 45 The Court noted that
provisions of the shipping laws had traditionally been construed
narrowly and thus have had limited application. 46 The Court concluded that "Congress could not have been unaware of the necessity
of construction imposed upon courts by such generality of language
and was well warned that in absence of more definite directions
47
• • • •"
The opinion bolstered its conclusion with another basic
concept stemming from "the long-heeded admonition of Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall that 'an act of congress [sic] ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . . ' " 48
This language of the Court does not evidence another principle
upon which the canon of construction rests. 49 Instead this admoni45. Id. The Court observed:
Rather he relies upon the literal catholicity of its terminology. If read literally, Congress has conferred an American right of action which requires nothing more than
that plaintiff be "any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment." It makes no explicit requirement that either the seaman, the employment or the injury have the slightest connection with the United States. Unless some
relationship of one or more of these to our national interest is implied, Congress has
extended our law and opened our courts to all alien seafaring men injured anywhere
in the world in service of watercraft of every foreign nation-a hand on a Chinese
junk, never outside Chinese waters, would not be beyond its literal wording.
Id. at 576-77.
46. Id. at 577. The Court determined:
The shipping laws of the United States, set forth in Title 46 of the United States
Code, comprise a patchwork of separate enactments, some tracing far back in our
history and many designed for particular emergencies. While some have been specific
in application to foreign shipping and others in being confined to American shipping,
many give no evidence that Congress addressed itself to their foreign application and
are in general terms which leave their application to be judicially determined from
context and circumstances. By usage as old as the Nation, such statutes have been
construed to apply only to areas and transactions in which American law would be
considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international law. Thus, in United
States u. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, this Court was called upon to interpret a statute of
1790 (1 Stat. 115) punishing certain acts when committed on the high seas by "any
person or persons," terms which, as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall observed, are "broad
enough to comprehend every human being." But the Court determined that the
literal universality of the prohibition "must not only be limited to cases within the
jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects to which the legislature intended
to apply them" (p. 631) and therefore would not reach a person performing the
proscribed acts aboard the ship of a foreign state on the high seas.
Id. at 577-78 (quoting Marshall, C.J., in The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804)).
47. Id. at 581.
48. Id. at 578 (quoting Marshall, C.J., in The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,
117-18 (1804)).
49. Id.
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tion of Marshall amounts to a prudential consideration which is in
"accord" 50 with "this doctrine of construction." 51 The Court clearly
points out that there is no question of infringement on principles of
international law:
On the contrary, we are simply dealing with a problem of statutory
construction rather commonplace in a federal system by which
courts often have to decide whether "any" or "every" reaches to the
limits of the enacting authority's usual scope or is to be applied to
foreign events or transactions. 52

The Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell 53
case once again demonstrates the substantial conduct theory. Although this case . involves the regulation of a foreign corporation
rather than an American "citizen, " 54 the court asserted jurisdiction
even in the face of an inconclusive Securities Exchange Act, 55 because there had been "significant" conduct in the United States. 511
There was domestic impact as well, since the acts committed in the
United States were part of a scheme to defraud an American investor. 57
A review of the cases reveals that the courts will employ the
presumption against extraterritoriality unless there is a showing
that there is substantial conduct within the United States or that
foreign activity is demonstrated as having a substantial domestic
impact or effect. In addition, the courts have applied statutes if
there is a criminal offense perpetrated against the U.S. Government
in the absence of clear language in the statute to the contrary.
In the case presently before the court, 58 there is no criminal
offense against the Government involved, nor has there been a
showing of any substantial conduct within the territorial boundaries of the United States. Unless there is demonstrated by the
Natural Resources Defense Council that there is substantial con50. Id.
51. Id.

52. Id. at 578-79. The Court footnoted this with a good discussion of the subject. Id. at
579n.7.
53. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
54. Id. at 1333.
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1976).
56. 468 F.2d at 1334. The significant conduct was "when substantial misrepresentations
were made in the United States." Id. at 1337.
57. Id.
58. National Resources Defense Council v. Export-Import Bank of the United States,
No.77-0080 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 14, 1977).
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duct or substantial impact within the United States, the courts
should utilize the clear language test511 which has invaluably aided
the courts in the past.
B.

Statutory Language

To satisfy the canon of construction reviewed earlier, 80 a statute
or a section of the statute81 involved must contain express language
or a clear indication that Congress intended it to have an extraterritorial scope. On its face this section does not have such an expression. Although "all agencies" 62 is certainly a clear indication that
Congress intended the statute to apply to every federal agency, the
subsequent language does not indicate whether the Act applies to
major federal actions within or without the territorial United States.
The phrase "human environment" 83 is equally uninformative as
one commentator has noted:
[I]t cannQt be inferred that simply because Congress used "human environment," rather than "national environment," it intended section 102(2)(C) to apply to the worldwide environment. It
seems clear that Congress utilized the former phrase to ensure that
the environmental consequences would be viewed from the human
perspective rather than solely from an objective physical perspective.84

This observation can be garnered from the remarks of Senator Jack59. The canon of construction or presumption against extraterritoriality mentioned before. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
60. Id.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). Section 102 provides:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: . . . (2)
all agencies of the Federal Government shall(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
sh<;mld the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Mich. Note, supra note 8, at 360.
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son accompanying the Senate Committee Report and Dr. Lynton
Caldwell's statement in the Senate Hearings. 115
Throughout the statute there are words and phrases of ambiguous meaning utilized, such as "man's," "environment," "biosphere," "all agencies," etc. Reliance on such words as indicating
an extraterritorial scope would be ill placed. A rule of statutory
construction laid down in American Banana, 88 cited in Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co. 87 and utilized in Sociedad Nacional De Manneros
de Honduras v. McCulloch, 811 establishes that "[w]ords having universal scope, such as '[e]very contract in restraint of trade,'
'[e]very person who shall monopolize,' etc., will be taken . . . to
mean only every one subject to such legislation, not all that the
legislator subsequently may be able to catch. " 811
Thus, it becomes clear that these words must be taken as describing subject matter within the territorial United States. Further, it should be noted that words such as biosphere are words of
art and, in this case, biosphere's definition and use indicates no
geographical or territorial "quantity."
If words of general m~aning are to be weighed, then the specific
words as "Americans" and "Nation" found scattered throughout
the NEPA must be balanced as well. For, if examined closely, these
words in their context seem to give the Act a decided domestic
character.
At the outset, the Act heralds, by its title, the probable domestic interest embodied in the statute. A title can and will be considered in interpreting a statute. 70 Here, National Environmental Policy Act seems to indicate a concern with the environmental policy
relating to one nation, the United States. 71
The preamble, which enumerates the purposes of the Act, suggests a predominant domestic purpose by the following phrase: "to
enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural re65. 115 CONG. R.Ec. 40416 (1969); Hearings on S . 1075, S. 237 and S. 1151 Before the
Senate Comm . on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings].
66. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
67. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
68. 201 F. Supp. 82 (D.D.C.), af{'d, 372 U.S. 10 (1962).
69. 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909).
70. 2A D. SANDS, STATtrrES AND STATtrrORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.03 (4th ed. 1973).
71. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1505 (1971). National is defined as,
"of, relating to, or affecting one nation as distinguished from several nations or a supranational group . . . compare INTERNATIONAL . . . . " Id.
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sources important to the nation . . . . " 72 Similarly, section lOl(a),1:1
which enumerates the environmental policy of Congress, states a
goal with this phrase: "and fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of Americans. " 74 In
addition, section 101(b)75 which delineates another list of goals, advances the theory that Congress was primarily concerned with domestic goals by the phrase "to improve and coordinate Federal
plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Na ti on
may- . . . (2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive,
and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings. " 711 A close
examination of these sections and the enacting clause easily provides the reader with a foundation for concluding that the statute
is domestic in concern. 77
A final argument to support this proposition is to be found in
section 201. 7x This subchapter calls for a report to be submitted to
Congress by the Council on Environmental Quality,
which shall set forth (1) the status and condition of the . . . environmental classes of the Nation ... (2) current and foreseeable trends
. . . and the effects of those trends on the social, economic, and
other requirements of the Nation; (3) the adequacy of available
natural resources for fulfilling human and economic requirements of
the Nation. 711

It is apparent from this that Congress was concerned with the
domestic problems and conditions that the Nation's environment
would produce and required a report only on the Nation's environment. It would be logical to conclude that if Congress was so concerned with the global environment, as evidenced by the scattered ,
references to the world's environment, it would have so indicated its
concern by requiring a review of the effect of federal agencies' programs and activities throughout the world.
72. 42 u.s.c. § 4321 (1970).
73. Id. § 4331(a) (1970).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. This conclusion can arguably be supported by the theories of noscitur a sociis and
ejusdem generis. "The meaning of a word is or may be known from the accompanying words."
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1209 (1968). "The doctrine means that general and specific words
are associated with and take color from each other, restricting general words to sense analogous to less general. Dunham v. State, 140 Fla. 754, 192 So. 324, 325, 326 (1939)." Id. "Of
the same kind, class, or nature." Id. at 608.
78. 42 u.s.c. § 4341 (1970).
79. Id.
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Legislative History

Legislative history is an additional tool used to interpret a statute. The history involved indicates first, an absence of a clear indication from Congress that 102(2)(C) action-forcing procedures have
an extraterritorial scope, and second, a strong suggestion, as the
Court has recognized, 80 that Congress was primarily concerned with
domestic issues. It appears that what little international concern
Congress had was codified in section 102(2) (E). Furthermore, the
history does not show any linkage between 102(2)(E) and 102(2)(C),
thus it is unlikely that these two provisions should be read together.
The House bill, H.R. 12549, was designed by the drafters 81
merely to amend the Fisheries and Wildlife Act 82 in order to set up
a Council on Environmental Quality. Hearings on the bill were held
by the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. 83 Of the numerous statements before the committee there is but a single reference, in a statement by Margaret Mead, 114 to the international scope
that the bill should have. These few sentences must be balanced
against the tremendous amount of testimony and material before
the Committee, which might be classified as domestic in concern.
It must be weighed in light of its effect on the committee. The remark engendered no debate. 85 Nor did it spur Congressmen to
amend H.R. 12549 to include a section 102(2)(C) type impact provision having an express international scope, or a section 102(2)(E)
type international cooperative provision. 86 In fact, the House bill
never contained either of these directives. 87
Instead, the Hearings culminated in a House Report88 which
clearly does not express an extraterritori.al scope and rather pointedly states:
The purpose of the bill, as hereby reported, is to create a Council on Environmental Quality with a broad and independent over80. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
81. Mr. Dingall, et al.
82. 16 u.s.c. §§ 741-754 (1976).
83. Hearings on H.R. 6750, H.R. 11886, H.R. 11942, H.R. 12077, H.R. 12180, H.R. 12207,
H.R. 12209, H.R. 12228, H.R . 12264, and H.R . 12409, Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
84. Id. at 26.
85. Id.
86. 115 CONG. REC. 26571-90 (1969).
87. Id.
88. H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as H. REP.].
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view of current and long-term trends in the quality of our national
environment to advise the President, and through him the Congress
and the American people on steps which may and should be taken
to improve the quality of that environment.'11'

The Hearings110 and the Report• 1 surrounding the Senate bill, S.
1075, must be examined and "accorded the greatest weight" in interpreting 102(2)(C), "since all the 102(2) directives found in NEPA
are taken from S. 1075."112 The Senate Hearings show "little attention"•3 paid to the "limited territorial scope of S. 1075."94 This lack
of commentary on extraterritoriality does not provide the requisite
clear indication necessary to give the NEPA 102(2)(C) directive an
extraterritorial scope.
The Senate Conference Report is not "comparably clear" 95 either. There is nothing in the Report which indicates that the
102(2)(C) provision requires federal agencies abroad to file impact
statements for foreign activities. There is no indication of an extraterritorial scope for 102(2)(C) at all. Finally, there is no indication
that 102(2)(C) and 102(2)(E) supplement each other and should be
construed in conjunction with each other. Nor does the section by
section analysis1111 give the slightest hint of an extraterritorial scope
for 102(2)(C). Instead, the Senate Report suggests that the draftsmen were concerned with the quality of the Nation's environment:
It is the unanimous view of the members of the Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee that our Nations present state of knowledge, our established public policies, and our existing governmental
institutions are not adequate to deal with the growing environmental problems and crises the Nation faces. 97
89. Id. at 1. The House Report further stated:
In achieving the purpose, the bill would require the transmission to the Congress
by the President of an annual environmental quality report on the status of various
aspects of the American environment, as well as on the foreseeable trends that may
affect that status, and on their impact on other national requirements.

Id.
90. Senate Hearings, supra note 65.
91. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
92. Mich. ·Note, supra note 8, at 366.
93. Id. at 367.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 366.
96. S. REP., supra note 91, at 20.
97. Id. at 4. The Senate Report continued:
The inadequacy of present knowledge, policies, and institutions is reflected in
our Nation's history, in our national attitudes, and in our contemporary life.
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On the other hand, there are words and phrases of broad meaning utilized throughout the legislative history. Words such as
"man's," "biosphere," "all," "environment," and "human environment" can be found in the Hearings, congressional records and documents and in the Senate and House Reports. However, application
of the American Banana theory of statutory construction would require that these words be construed to refer to subject matter within
the territorial limits of the United States.
Moreover, Cong-ress must be aware that language of such general character will be construed narrowly by the courts. 98 Therefore,
Congress' failure to give a clear indication of an extraterritorial
scope for 102(2)(C)-or some sign of a link between 102(2)(C) and
102(2)(E) in the legislative history-can only mean that Congress
did not intend the provision to have such a scope.
There are statements to be found in the Senate Hearings which
show a concern with the international aspects of environmental
problems. Statements such as William Macomber's recommendation that the bill take into account that:
1. The deterioration of the national environment is part of a global
process and thus requires remedial action on an international as well
as a national scale.
2. Study, review and research must, therefore, be extended to take
into account problems . . . beyond national borders . . . .

3. The solution of the environmental problem being a matter of
national interest as well as of international concern, U.S. participation in bilateral and multilateral programs dealing with the international aspects of the problem must be recognized as a vital part of
U.S. policy to cope with environmental problems. 99

This language should be com pared to the remarks found in the
section by section analysis on section 102(2)(E) in both the Senate
Report and the final Conference Report. The similarity is striking.
In recognition of the fact that environmental problems are not
confined by political boundaries, all agencies of the Federal GovernIf the United States is to create and maintain a balanced and healthful environment, new means and procedures to preserve environmental values in the larger
public interest, to coordinate Government activities that shape our future environment, and to provide guidance and incentives for State and local government and
for private enterprise must be devised .

Id.
98. See notes 25, 26, 28, 47 supra and accompanying text.
99. Senate Hearings, supra note 65, at 10.
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ment which have international responsibilities are authorized and
directed to lend support to appropriate international efforts to anticipate and prevent a decline in the quality of the worldwide environment. In doing so however, the agencies are constrained to act
in a manner consistent with the foreign policy of the United
States. 100

It seems apparent from this comparison, that the addition of

section 102(2)(E), after the Senate Hearings, was intended to encapsulate this and similar statements, ideas, and solutions into
102(2)(E) and make it "the sole protection for the international
environment." 101 Senator Jackson's remarks accompanying the ·
reading of the Conference Report into the record would seem to
prove that this observation is correct. 102
Thus, it is logical to conclude that 102(2)(E) is the only directive Congress 103 intended to have an international scope and that all
other procedural directives, including 102(2)(C), are concerned with
domestic activities.
There is a strong indication that Congress, in particular, the
Senate, was primarily concerned with domestic issues in enacting
the NEPA. The fact that the Senate Hearings were held before the
Committee on the Interior and Insular Affairs, a committee traditionally concerned with domestic problems, is significant. It should
be noted that the record does not indicate that the Committee ever
officially consulted with the Foreign Relations Committee or any
100. 115 CONG. REC. 40420 (1969) .
101. Mich. Note, supra note 8, at 367.
102. 115 CONG. REC . 40416-17 (1969). He said:
Another provision that should be brought to the attention of the Senate is section
102(e) of the conference report.
This provision was added to the bill as an amendment I offered in the Senate
Interior Committee in June. The purpose of the provision is to give statutory authority to all Federal agencies to participate in the development of a positive, forward
looking program of international cooperation in dealing with environmental problems
all nations and all people share . . . .

Id.
103. The House is included, here, as well. The House report displayed similar language:
"It is an unfortunate fact that many and perhaps most forms of environmental pollution cross
international boundaries as easily as they cross states lines." H. REP., supra note 88, at 7.
The Committee seems to have been concerned with domestic activities which could have
environmental impacts on other countries. For example, pollution from our smokestacks
could easily cross into Canada or Mexico. Thus, the Committee was expressing concern as it
should that one nation's domestic activities should not despoil another nation's environment.
There is no indication that there was concern about our foreign activities environmental
impact, which have been encouraged by another nation.
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other committee. It has been argued that Senator Jackson, the bill's
sponsor, intentionally limited the scope of S. 1075 so that his committee would have jurisdiction. 104
In fact, it seems clear from the statements made by the Senators and Congressmen at the Hearings and in debate before adoption of the bills that most of the NEPA, including the action-forcing
procedures, reflects a domestic concern and scope. 105
Finally, it should be noted that in S. 1075 section 102(2)(E) was
characterized as "international effects." 108 Several statements
throughout the legislative history lead one to believe that Congress
was concerned with the problem of domestic activities, 107 having an
environmental impact on other countries outside the United States.
For example, the use of pesticides in the United States has environmental impact on other countries as well, since the pesticides can
eventually get into our rivers and flow into Canada or Mexico. 108
This is a problem that concerns every nation. 109 There is no indication, though, that Congress was concerned about our limited involvement in joint foreign activities having environmental impact
where these activities are encouraged or invited by the nation's
sovereign.
104. See F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE CouRTS (1973).
105. 115 CONG. REc. 40416 (1969). Senator Jackson characterized NEPA as a "national

policy for the management of America's future environment." Id.
Senator Allot, co-sponsor of S. 1075 summed up what the NEPA stood for by the following statement. "It has been accurately stated that by the enactment of this measure, the
Congress is not giving the American people something, rather the Congress is responding to
the demands of the American people." Id. at 40422.
Senator Muskie added: "Mr. President, S. 1075 brings into focus the Senate's continuing
concern for the quality of the Nation's environment." Id. at 29053.
Senator Nelson manifested his concern for the nation's environment. "In much of the
Nation, we destroyed our forests. Then across the nation, we destroyed our rivers." Senate
Hearings, supra note 65, at 59.
Finally Senator Randolph stated:
[tlhis legislation which is of concern, ... to Congress and the people of the United
States. Today, approximately 203 million persons live in an area that is becoming
increasingly confined. Because of the problems of urban development, mobility of
people, and the methods by which products are moved from one point to another our
society and our environment are constantly changing.
115 CoNG. REc. 40425 (1969).
106. 115 CONG. REC. 29056 (1969).
107. Note that activities, here, should have a direct environmental impact. In other
words, there is direct causation. The act of building and running a railroad would have a
direct environmental impact, however a contract to finance same would not.
108. It should be noted that these activities have a direct environmental impact. See
note 103 supra.
109. See note 103 supra.
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CASE LAW

To date there has been no case decided which has directly dealt
with the issue of the applicability of the National Environmental
Policy Act to foreign assistance programs. However, five cases have
raised the issue of extraterritorial application of the NEPA.
The case of most importance is Sierra Club v. AEC, uo which
directly questioned the applicability of the NEPA to foreign assistance programs. The suit centered around a nuclear generating system export program. The sale of these .systems and fuels to other
countries involved the financial aid of the Export-Import Bank. The
sales also involved technical help and cooperation of the Atomic
Energy Commission, and the State Department. All three were
named as defendants in the suit filed by the Sierra Club, which
claimed that each named defendant should file a 102(2)(C) impact
statement. 111 The issue was never decided since the AEC voluntarily
agreed to prepare an impact statement. The issue being moot, the
court held it "inappropriate where, as here, the court finds it unnecessary to impose specifically any positive NEPA obligation on Eximbank."112 Although it might be argued that the court in effect
acknowledged some agency would have to file an impact statement
for a foreign assistance program, it is possible to distinguish this
case on its facts, its holding, 113 and the underlying interest involved.
The potential for great harm, including domestic imP,act, is much
greater than that which would be found in most foreign assistance
programs.
The court in People of Enewetak v. Laird 114 decided whether the
NEPA applied to the Defense Department's activities in a trust
territory. The Defense Department had filed an original impact
statement concerning the project on Enewetak which was to test our
nuclear defenses by simulating nuclear blasts with high explosives.115 The Council on Environmental Quality requested a more
complete r.eport be filed. The Defense Department agreed to file
one. Thus, there was no question as to the filing of the impact
statement. The issue which remained was whether the court had
110. Civil No. 1867-73 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1974) .
Id.
112. Id.
113. Because this case was settled out of court, no decision on the merits of extraterritorialy applying the NEPA was reached.
114. 353 F. Supp. 811 (D . Hawaii 1973) .
115. Id. at 814.
111.
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subject matter jurisdiction under the NEPA to enjoin continued
core drilling while the new impact statement was being prepared. 116
The court held that the NEPA would apply since the residents of
the Trust Territory are subject to U.S. authority and "do not have
an independent government which can move to protect them from
United States' actions that are thought to be harmful to their
environment. " 117
In the People of Saipan v. Dept. of Interior, m the same court
held that the NEPA could be applied to federal agencies operating
in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 119 Suit was filed in order
to enjoin implementation of a lease agreement for construction and
operation of a hotel on public land in Saipan. The Trust Territory
Government, in particular the High Commissioner, had not prepared an environmental impact statement which would consider the
hotel's influence on the environment. The court concluded that "the
Trust Territory Government was not a federal agency" 120 subject to
judicial review under the APA or NEPA, and thus dismissed the
suit.
It is worthy to note that the Enewetak court did confront the
Foley canon of construction. The court did not reject the canon but
found instead, that there was an indication that Congress intended
the statute to extend to trust territories by its use of "the Nation" 121
language instead of the "United States. " 122 The court stated:
Congress must manifest an intention to include the Trust Territory
within the coverage of a given statute before the courts will apply
its provisions to claims arising there. Such an intention is usually
indicated by defining the term "State" or "United States" as used
in the legislation to include the Trust Territory. Hence a problem
of statutory construction arises . . . .
By its own terms, NEPA is not restricted to the United States
territory delimited by the fifty states. In contrast to the usual practice, the term "United States" is left undefined and used only twice
in the entire statute, and in both of these instances it serves the
limited purpose of identifying certain policies, regulations and pub116. Id. at 820.
117. Id. at 818.
118. 356 F. Supp. 645 (D. Hawaii 1973), aff'd as modified, 502 F .2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
119. 356 F. Supp. at 647.
120. Tarlock, The Application of the NEPA to the Darien Gap Highway Project, 7
N.Y.U .J. lNT'L L. & POL. 459, 465 (1974) .
121. 353 F. Supp. at 816.
122. Id. at 815.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol5/iss2/6

18

Galton: The Scope of the National Environmental Policy Act

1978)

The Scope of the NEPA

335

lie laws that would otherewise remain ambiguous. Where one would
have expected "United States" to have been used, the lawmakers
substituted the much broader term "Nation." 123

The court's opinion in Enewetak, and subsequently in People
of Saipan, can be also attributed to a United States governmental
interest. Congress had legislative control over the island. Moreover,
in each case there was no sovereign power to protect the people
involved. Instead, the United States, as trustee, was burdened with
this responsibility.
The fourth case, Sierra Club v. Colemen, 12' involved a deficient
impact statement already prepared and circulated by the Federal
Highway Administration. The defendants, the Department of
Transportation and the Federal Highways Administration, were
engaged in constructing the "Darien Gap Highway" 125 through Panama and Columbia which would link up the Pan American Highway
System of South America with the Inter-American Highway. 128
Sierra Club brought suit to enjoin further construction until an
impact statement was prepared that would meet the substantive
and procedural requirements of NEPA. 127 The court granted the
injunction noting that the defendant never objected to filing an
environmental impact statement. Instead, the defendants argued
that their original document complied with the impact statement
requirements of NEPA. 128 In answer to this argument, the court
outlined several major problems found in the document:
The second major defect in the "Assessment" is a substantive
one: the failure of that document to adequately discuss the problems of the transmission of aftosa, or "foot-and-mouth" disease.
While there is in the document a recognition of the probable transTnission of aftosa absent the most stringent of control programs, .and
a consequent discussion of the evolving plans for preventing transmission of the disease to North America, there is no discussion
whatsoever of the environmental impact upon the United States of
a breakdown of such a control program. Considering that, according
to the undisputed record in this case, aftosa is the most serious
existing livestock disease, which if it spread into the United States
could result in the destruction of up to twenty-five percent of North
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 815-16 (footnotes omitted).
405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C. 1975).
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 56.
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American livestock and an economic loss of ten biilion dollars, as
well as the extinction of such endangered species as the American
bison, it seems evident that an impact statement which fails to
discuss this possibility is fatally de(icient. 129

Thus, the case is of little support to the proposition of the
extraterritorial reach of the 102(2)(C) provision since an impact
statement had already been prepared and no argument was made
against its preparation. At best, the case simply signifies the court's
willingness to r~quire NEPA disclosure where there is likelihood of
substantial impact on United States territory.
The final case, Wilderness Society v. Morton, 130 is of questionable relevance to the issue of the reach of the NEPA. The court
recognized the right of a Canadian environmental group to enter
into a suit filed against the Secretary of the Interior to test whether
he had complied with procedures under the NEPA before he decided
to issue permits for the Trans-Alaska pipeline. However, "[u]nder
general principles of international law, the United States has a duty
to manage activities within its territorial boundaries so as not to
cause damage to environment of adjoining countries." 131 Moreover,
this case was not deciding U.S. Government agency activities within
the jurisdiction of another sovereign. Thus, finding no direct support in case law, it might be of some assistance to review cases in
which the courts have not applied NEPA 102(2)(C) due to countervailing considerations.
In Cohen v. Price Commission, 132 the court refused to apply
section 102(2)(C) "to an authorization by the Price Commission
under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 for a fare increase on
New York City subways and buses." 133 The court did not grant the
requested temporary relief. Instead the court seemed to feel that the
plaintiffs would fail on the merits "because the Price Commission's
duty to act with dispatch was inconsistent with the systematic and
interdisciplinary study required by NEPA. " 134
The District Court for the District of Columbia reasoned similarly when it dismissed a suit brought by the Gulf Oil Corporation 135
129. Id. at 55.
130. 463 F.2d 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
131. Tarlock, supra note 120, at 465.
132. 337 F. Supp. 1236 (S .D.N.Y. 1972) .
133. Tarlock, supra note 120, at 467.
134. Id.
135. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 373 F. Supp. 1102 (0.D.C . 1974), a{{'d, 502 F.2d 1154
(Temp: Erner. Ct. App. 1974).
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which contended that the Energy Office's establishment of crude oil
quota constituted a major federal action and thus required the filing
of an impact statement.
Mr. Tarlock has persuasively argued in his article, The Application of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the
Darien Gap Highway Project 136 that: "Cohen and Gulf Oil do stand
for the proposition that the agency can exempt itself by demonstrating that the blanket application of NEPA would seriously interfere
with its ability to carry out its primary mission." 137
His observation seems to be well grounded since the court in
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Federal Maritime Commission 138
refused to grant a declaratory judgment and preliminary injunction
on a suit challenging the so-called "Far East minibridge tariffs" 139
on the theory that the defendants violated the National Environmental Policy Act in their handling of the tariffs. The court reasoned that the Federal Maritime Commission had an obligation to
accept tariffs under the Shipping Act. If compliance with the NEPA
requirement would interfere with the agency's duty, the court concluded that the NEPA "might have to yield." 140
IV. POLICY AND OTHER COUNTERVAILING
CONSIDERATIONS

Courts have considered, and always will consider, other factors,
policies, and arguments before deciding to apply the National Environmental Policy Act. Even if a court should find that there was a
theoretical base, through statutory language or legislative history,
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Tarlock, supra note 120.
Id. at 467-68.
392 F. Supp. 795 (D.D.C. 1975).
Id. at 798.
Id. at 802.
Further, even if there is an inconsistency between NEPA's requirements and the
Shipping Act, plaintiffs have failed to show that the former would control. By its own
terms, NEPA applies only "to the fullest extent possible." Agencies are exempted
from compliance with NEPA when compliance would give rise to agency violation
or statutory obligations. Environmental Defense Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). The FMC [Fed. Maritime Comm.] is bound to
accept tariffs in the foreign commerce that otherwise meet the regulations issued
pursuant to the statute ... . If NEPA procedures conflict with this duty, the NEPA
procedures might have to yield. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission
476 F.2d 142 (1973). A preliminary injunction should not be issued in the face of a
substantial question raised regarding the applicability of NEPA to the FM C's actions
in this case.

Id.
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for extending the NEPA to foreign assistance programs requiring
activities within another sovereign's jurisdiction, the defendant
agency should suggest practical considerations to the court for nonapplication of the NEPA.
As noted above, violation of an agency's mandate or significant
interference with the implementation of the agency's purpose will
be weighed heavily against strict NEPA application. Thus, the
Export-Import Bank has in the past directed the court's attention
to its enabling legislation. 141 In its brief for a motion for summary
judgment in the Sierra Club v. AEC case, the Eximbank analyzed
the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 and concluded that the function and purpose of the bank was to provide financing and other
assistance so that United States' exports would be able to compete
in world markets. In addition, the bank noted that the 1971 amendment was adopted to strengthen the bank's slipping competitive
position by giving the bank more flexibility . 142
Application of the NEPA would impair the bank's ability to
compete and thus seriously interfere with its purpose. Two major
factors which produce this disadvantage is the time and the money
141. In its brief in support of a motion for summary judgment Eximbank outlined several
plausible arguments for violation or interference with purpose. Sierra Club v. United States
Atomic Energy Commission, Civil No. 1867-73 (D.D.C. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Eximbank
Brief].
142. Id. at 41-42.
A review of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, demonstrates that
the very nature of the Bank and the activities it performs are fundamentally incompatible with the application of NEPA to Bank activities. The language of that Act
makes very clear that the sole function of the Bank is to assist United States exports
in world markets by providing export financing that is competitive with export financing provided by other exporting nations. Thus, the purpose of the Bank is to
"foster expansion of exports of goods and related services, thereby contributing to the
promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the
increased development of the productive resources of the United States."
In 1971, Congress amended the Export-Import Bank Act to strengthen the Bank
and make U.S. exports more competitive in world markets. As the Senate Report on
the bill which became the 1971 amendment noted:
The United States has, over the past decade, experienced a persistent
imbalance in its international payments accounts. More recently, this imbalance has been aggravated by the failure of U.S. exports to keep pace with
greatly increasing imports. At the same time, the growth of U.S. exports
failed also to keep pace with the growth of world trade.
The primary feature in the amendment was a provision to withdraw Bank receipts and disbursements from the unified Federal budget. This was important so
that "regardless of fluctuations in Government monetary and fiscal policies on the
money markets at home and abroad" the Bank would still have flexibility "to meet
the needs of the U.S. Export community .
"
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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it takes to prepare an impact statement.
The Eximbank has urged that compliance with 102(2)(C) procedures would seriously frustrate the quick decisionmaking necessary for international negotiations.1 43 An impact statement and preceding assessment, depending on the project, can take a long time
to prepare if done conscientiously. This delay can interfere greatly
with the start and completion of any project. In a world which relies
increasingly on computers in order to expedite decisions such "red
tape" can be a serious handicap in competing with other governments for foreign markets.
Cost is another factor which must be taken into account. It has
been estimated that one environmental impact statement has cost
$7 million to prepare. 144 Although the preparation of many impact
statements would not approach this figure, it is likely that the hiring
and sending of experts to a foreign country would be of great expense
to both the applicant nation or corporation and the agency. This is
not to mention the cost in terms of travel time. Whatever the final
appro-ximation for each project, this figure must be added to the
costs of the hundreds of other projects 145 which the agency engages
in each month. The final figure could be astronomical and could
well interfere with the budget of the agency.
The burden of the cost must be allocated as well. Either it is
distributed to the applicant nation directly by requiring it to produce its own impact statement which will meet 102(2)(C) standards
(the agency could also provide the statement and bill directly), or
else the cost is deflected by charging higher interest rates. Whatever
option chosen, short of congressional budget allocation or subsidy,
the burden will be shifted to the applicant. This will of course be
sorely resented by all nations, rich and poor, and regarded as a
special hardship by poor nations who would be compelled to spend
money to get money. Certainly, applicants who can pick and choose
between nations and markets for purchases and financing will hesitate before incurring this added expense, red tape, and delay.
The Eximbank has also indicated that 102(2)(C) disclosure requirements "would frustrate foreign government demands for confidence of negotiations." 146 True, secrets or materials necessitating
143. Id. at 43.
144. Joint Hearings before the Comm . on Public Works and the Comm . on the Interior
and Insular Affairs, 92nd Cong. , 2d Sess. 557 (1972).
145. Eximbank Brief, supra note 141, at 17. " Inasmuch as the Bank is involved in
hundreds of 'significant' export financing transactions . . . . " Id .
146. Mich . Note, supra note 8, at 373.
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such confidence could be deleted. However, this would render the
effectiveness of 102(2)(C) minimal at best and make the preparation
of an impact statement a futile exercise.
Perhaps the most devastating argument to be noted is the uncertainty which judicial review of NEPA procedure produces whenever Eximbank has committed itself on a project. This factor would
not be lost on the potential applicant. With a federal court lurking
in the background ready to test whether an impact statement is
necessary and then whether it is adequate, the certainty necessary
for most business deals would be destroyed. No applicant nation
would wish to tie up its possibilities for financing by contracting
with a nation which is never certain until the final court decision is
handed down that it will be able to supply the money to start or
complete a project. Nor does a court's inquiry stop once an
"adequate" impact statement is filed. If an environmental group is
so inclined, it can bring a suit to enjoin further action on a project
already approved by an agency, stipulating that the agency's go
ahead decision was arbitrary and did not properly take into account
the environmental factors and alternatives brought out by the filed
impact statement. "Most circuits, following the lead of Calvert
Cliffs' . .. have required a showing of a good faith effort on the part
of the agency to weigh environmental and developmental values in
striking a final balance between the activity and its alternatives. " 147
With a foreign policy which in large part has rested on monetary incentives, Eximbank has been "a powerful tool in the hands
of those who formulate this nation's overall foreign policy." 148 Congress has recognized that "the Bank is, in effect, an arm of this
nation's foreign policy apparatus." 1411 Thus, the Bank in its decisionmaking process has to have considered: "this nation's foreign policy
objective of supporting free and democratic governments throughout the world; and (c) enhance U.S. prestige and influence in neutral states so that these states can resist the political influence of
Communist countries. " 150
Unfortunately, the difficulties delineated above could greatly
undermine our foreign policy objectives. Applicant countries would
certainly hesitate before accepting our foreign assistance. Similarly,
applicants would consider Russia and other countries' willingness to
147.
148.
149.
150.

Tarlock, supra note 120, at 470.
Eximbank Brief, .<iupra note 141, at 20.
Id.
Id.
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finance without such cost and delay. Furthermore, our foreign policy would be damaged and our image tarnished because the countries would regard extraterritorial application of NEPA as
"environmental imperialism." 151 Although it can be considered as a
restriction on our own agency, putting few burdens on the applicant
nations, many nations might view it as an imposition of our environmental standards and resent it. 152 And, in part, the policy behind
extension of NEPA to foreign jurisdiction is based on a belief that
"it is highly improbable that host countries will ever consider environmental factors to the same extent as this country." 153 This sentiment is reminiscent of the "white man's burden" expressed by this
country and others in its imperialistic stage. It is a belief not necessarily founded on truth. Furthermore, it is questionable whether
this country has the right to determine another country's environmental policy unless an impact is shown upon the U.S.
The less developed countries argue that it is inequitable to
require "the less developed countries to divert scarce resources to
environmental quality in order to rectify the past environmental
depredations of the developed nation," 154 and that the financial burden should rest on the developed nation if it wishes to achieve a
'certain standard of environmental quality.
Application of the NEPA 102(2)(C) to foreign assistance agencies essentially performing foreign policy functions raises serious
questions of unconstitutional infringement by Congress upon the
foreign policy power of the executive branch. "The extent of congressional power in the field of foreign policy remains an open question. The views range from exclusive executive power to determine
foreign policy to recognition of concurrent power in Congress." 155 It
has been argued by one commentator that Congress, having recognized the possible "legislative usurpation of functions reserved to
the executive," 158 inserted a saving feature which dissipates possible
constitutional infirmities. That saving feature is the phrase "where
consistent with the foreign policy of the United States. " 157 Perhaps
the use of this phrase does dissipate constitutional infirmities, but
151. Mich. Note, supra note 8, at 378.
152. Tarlock, supra note 120, at 468.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Mich. Note, supra note 8, at 353 (footnotes omitted). See generally Berger, The
Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1972).
156. Strausberg, supra note 3, at 59.
157. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E)).
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this expression is found in 102(2)(E) and not in 102(2)(C) procedures. It is significant that Congress felt it necessary to put in such
a saving feature in an international cooperation provision. It would
be logical to conclude that in the 102(2)(C) more stringent actionforcing directive, Congress would have inserted a similar feature, or
one of even more flexibility, if it had intended 102(2)(C) to apply
to foreign policy agencies.
The insertion of this "saving feature" underscores the possibility that practically speaking a court would not require a foreign
assistance agency to file an impact statement. The agency could
make a showing of conflict with foreign policy and the court would
exempt it. "[A] court might well conclude that requiring the preparation of an impact statement for extraterritorial activities would
be relatively pointless if the nature of those activities necessitated
that only a minimal standard of adequacy be applied." 1511
Finally, it can be argued that for prudential reasons the court
should not review the extraterritorial activities of federal agencies.
To apply the NEPA 102(2)(C) requirement to these activities would
require the court to review these activities as well, if there is to be
any enforcement of these provisions. "Traditionally, the federal judiciary has been reluctant to intervene in the conduct of foreign
affairs." 1511 An analogy might be made to the act of state doctrine:
A court might therefore rationally conclude that the federal
activity under the control of the United States would not be an
appropriate occasion to assess the environmental impact of an assistance project, since so much would depend on measures taken by a
sovereign independent of United States control. 160

V.

CONCLUSION

Environmental planning is a desirable goal. But the question
is whether the impact procedure is the best way of accomplishing
this objective "when two or more sovereigns share the responsbility
for a project. " 161
This Note has focused on the statute itself to determine
whether the statutory language and legislative history indicate a
congressional intent to give the impact statement directive an extraterritorial scope.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Tarlock, supra note 120, at 471.
Id.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 473.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol5/iss2/6

26

Galton: The Scope of the National Environmental Policy Act

1978]

The Scope of the NEPA

343

Applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, it must
be concluded that there is no language in the statute or legislative
history which would satisfy this well-established canon of construction. To the contrary, it is highly probable that 102(2)(E), the
international cooperation provision, was intended as an exclusive
statement of the international aspects of the otherwise domestically oriented National Environmental Policy Act.
It is evident, as well, that case law to date does not directly
support the assertion that 102(2)(C) has an extraterritorial scope.
Nor does it, or the language and legislative history of the statute,
prove that the two provisions, 102(2)(C) and 102(2)(E), must be
construed together. Instead, the case law points to the possibility
that courts are willing to entertain countervailing considerations.
The numerous policy arguments present the court with a variety of rationales as to why it would be impracticable, and unconstitutional to apply the NEPA to foreign assistance programs. Thus,
a court, if it should decide to apply the NEPA, must carefully consider the possible ramifications of its holding in each case.
However, if the plaintiff should be able to demonstrate substantial and significant domestic conduct or direct impact on the
environment of the United States, the court might be warranted in
dropping the presumption against extraterritoriality. This, coupled
with a finding, if ascertainable, of some congressional intent to
apply NEPA 102(2)(C) extraterritorially, could provide the basis for
a theoretical extraterritorial application of the NEPA. At that stage,
the court would be faced with the practical problems of applying the
102(2)(C) provisions. Here, the court should allow a showing by the
foreign assistance agency of reasons why the NEPA should yield.
Jeremy Calton
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